Beatrice de Graaf (#4: On Transatlantic Alliances)

(University Utrecht)

I want to begin by sincerely thanking the organizers for this excellent series and for the invitation to join such a distinguished panel. I am truly happy to contribute. I would like to make three main points today framed by the current context here in the Netherlands, in June 2025, at the eve of the NATO Summit in The Hague.

1. NATO and the Strange Celebration

Right now, in the Netherlands, there is a sense of mayhem in the air. The NATO summit has arrived in our capital. While “celebrating” might not be quite the right word, the event has certainly been staged and framed as a kind of ceremonial marriage, marking decades of NATO and the transatlantic alliance between Europe and the United States.

Yet many Dutch citizens are asking: Why is half of The Hague shut down? Why are there so many police, military vehicles, and helicopters? And for what? Will this summit even produce tangible outcomes? There is also the lingering question of whether President Trump will show up at all. This moment feels surreal: the Netherlands has lobbied for years to host such a summit just as other countries have. But now that it is here, people are asking: What, exactly, are we hosting? What is the meaning of this transatlantic relationship in the present?

• Transatlantic Alliance: Always Transactional

Let me shift to a broader historical reflection based on research I have been involved with at Utrecht over the last decade as part of a project called “Reconstructing Europe: Blueprints of Hope.” What we found, through deep archival and theoretical work, is that the transatlantic relationship, from the very beginning, was never a simple “love affair.” It was always a transactional marriage of convenience, not a romantic bond based on mutual understanding. The foundations of postwar Europe were laid through a web of interlinked treaties: Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, the NATO Treaty, and the early European Coal and Steel Community agreements. All of these were part of a strategic package, negotiated primarily in the late 1940s.

Let me illustrate this with a story.

The key U.S. figure who came to Europe to broker these deals was Paul G. Hoffman—a car salesman, the Elon Musk of his era. He had led Studebaker, and later headed the Marshall Plan administration. He was tasked with making promises to Europeans. His pitch to them was: You will get investment and aid as long as you commit to rearming and investing in U.S. defense manufacturers. That included companies like Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, Raytheon, and Northrop Grumma, all of which, still today, consume the bulk of European defense budgets. This was not a neutral gift. It was a strategic deal, with strings attached. So again, my point is that: the transatlantic relationship was never purely values based; it was built on exchange, leverage, and economic conditionality.

• The Relationship Was Always Fragile

Let’s be honest – this relationship has always had hiccups, moments of distrust and tension. Consider:

• In the 1950s, Eisenhower threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe unless certain defense demands were met.
• In the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle pulled France out of NATO’s integrated command and declared nuclear independence.
• In the 1970s and 1980s, anti-American terrorism targeted military installations in West Germany and the Netherlands.
• During the NATO double-track crisis (1979–85), the Dutch Parliament refused to ratify U.S. missile deployments, prompting Moscow’s Politburo to label the Netherlands the “weakest link” in NATO.

These patterns reveal something consistent: the United States pushes, whether for military spending, tariff reductions, or strategic compliance, and Europe often drags its feet, tries to bandwagon, or simply refuses. This has always been the tension at the heart of the alliance. And today, if we are going to celebrate this “marriage,” we need to do so with open eyes. We should recognize it for what it is: at most transactional, and certainly not unconditional.

• Closing Thought: A Realistic Picture of Europe’s Role

In the Netherlands, we have a saying that captures our current sentiment: “We want to keep the parents together for the sake of the children.” The “parents” in this metaphor are the United States, and Europe is the “children” including countries like the Netherlands which still need the security umbrella that this relationship provides. We know we are not yet ready to stand alone militarily. It may take another six to nine years to build up the capacities required to confront Russia or other global threats on our own terms.

So yes, we need this relationship. However, we need it not as a myth, not as a nostalgic illusion, but as a realist, culturalist, economic, and security compact, one that evolves, one that is self-aware, and one that acknowledges the very real crisis we are in. Thank you.

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